
In Case of Emergency Dial 911 or 685-5222
Skaneateles Fire Department
77 West Genesee Street
P.O. Box 151
Skaneateles, NY 13152
315 - 685 - 3496
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System
AUGUST
Report Number: 07-960
Report Date: 06/14/2007 1603
Demographics
Department type: Combination, Mostly volunteer
Job or rank: Fire Fighter
Department shift: 24 hours on - 48 hours off
Age: 34 - 42
Years of fire service experience:
Region: FEMA Region V
Event Information
Event type: Training activities: formal training classes, in-station drills, multicompany drills, etc.
Event date and time: 12/16/2006 0000
Hours into the shift:
Event participation: Witnessed event but not directly involved in the event
Do you think this will happen again?
What do you believe caused the event?
• Procedure
• Decision Making
• Accountability
• Communication
• Weather
What do you believe is the loss potential?
• Life threatening injury
• Lost time injury
Event Description
Training began at approximately 0720 hours with a briefing conducted at the
station in which all members participating were given an orientation in the
classroom of the schedule, assignments and objectives for the training session. A
diagram was produced on the dry erase board of the incident area sketch. Eight
companies were assigned with inside safety crews and 3 stokers were used for
prop setting and fire growth monitoring. All stokers were given instructions not
to deviate from fuel load sets. Evacuation signal and PAR procedures were
reviewed along with floor plan, MAYDAY radio call, all training objectives and
safety line placement was discussed. At the training site, the lead instructor and
inside safety crews completed a walk through of the site reviewing fire set
locations and ventilation cutaways. All NFPA 1403 compliant devices were
reviewed and identified (egress points, vent holes, etc.). All lines were laid out,
PPE was checked, and roll call of all companies was taken prior to the first
evolution. Three burns had taken place prior to the incident burn. Burn 4 began
with the fire on the front porch in Division A. Fire was ignited by stokers and
allowed to begin free burning. Fire set was 4 wood pallets, straw and a
combustible finish of wood paneling was present to approximately 3' level around
the inside of the room. During free burn, the windows on Division A/B began to
fail. The inside safety crew (Firefighters A & B) along with three stokers were
located on the first floor of the fire building. Firefighter A & B proceeded to the
2nd floor to assume a safety position and assist in watching crews working on
2nd floor. The attack team mounted the attack approximately 8 minutes after
fire ignition and had trouble with a kinked line, which slowed the attack. The
stoker line was charged and positioned into the fire floor through Division C. The
line was not staffed by firefighter A, firefighter B or any of the stokers.
Conditions deteriorated rapidly both visibly and with heat build up. Fire began to
lap out of windows on Division A extending to the soffits of the house. At
approximately 1056, a radio report was heard that firefighters A & B were in
trouble and a ladder was requested to the 2nd floor at Division D. At this time, 4
safety personnel, 3 stokers and a 4 person attack team were in the structure. A
stand by RIT took Division A’s back-up line and knocked the fire down on the
main floor while other outside crews placed a second 16' ladder to the window
were firefighter B was signaling for help. Dense black smoke was igniting and
surrounded him. The ladder did not reach the sill of the window and instead was
hooked with the ladders hooks to the sill creating an almost vertical placement.
Firefighter B was able to bail out. Firefighter A came to the window with extreme
deteriorating conditions of fire and superheated smoke over his head. Firefighter
A escaped the 2nd floor in similar fashion as Firefighter B. During Firefighter A’s
escape, he lost contact with the ladder and fell to the ground striking a rescuer
who broke Firefighter A's fall and both landed on the ground. A PAR check was
initiated of all crews and all personnel were accounted for. Firefighter B suffered
minor injuries from the bail. Firefighter A received burns over an undetermined
percentage of his body. His burns included ears, neck, cheek, hand area and
steam burns to his back and arms. Firefighter A refused treatment at the scene
by paramedics but was later transported by his Fire Chief to a local emergency
room for evaluation. Upon evaluation of the burns to Firefighter A, was
transferred to a burn unit in a nearby major city. The firefighter who was
attempting to rescue Firefighter A when he fell, suffered a minor neck injury and
back pain that cause one day of lost time. Firefighter A remained in the burn unit
for approximately 5 days and was off work for several weeks.
Lessons Learned
An independent investigation was launched into this incident as directed by the
hosting department Chief. Investigators were used from nearby training
academy and all had experience investigating training injury incidents. The
independent investigation made the following recommendations. 1. All
participants must were NFPA approved structure firefighter gear. The firefighter
who received burns used an older rubberized set of gear and from burns and self
admission, did not use a flash hood or the hood provided on the helmet. 2. All
combustible interior wall finishing must be removed. One combustible panel was
left in place and possibly increased fuel load. 3. Assure all paths of egress are
maintained and protected. If training is taking place on upper floors, assure that
proper size ladders are in place on all sides where egress may become
necessary. 4. Ignition and interior safety teams should be limited to two
personnel. Keeping safety teams interior from incipient stage through
extinguishment should be carefully considered for each evolution. Every interior
safety team shall have the protection of a hose line capable of delivering a
minimum of 95 GPM. 5. Prior to the start of each evolution, recheck all
components of the drill using a safety officer checklist. This includes but is not
limited to radio checks, water supply, fire streams and hose lines match the
required fire flow for the evolution. 6. Constantly monitor weather conditions and
if necessary suspend the training until favorable weather conditions exist. This
includes changing wind conditions. During this training evolution, the wind
increased significantly during the 4th (incident) burn. 7. Follow all components of
NFPA 1403 when conducting live fire training. Continue to utilize the standards in
the development of live fire training in the form of checklists and templates.
Have a minimum of three separate people go through the checklist to make sure
something was not missed and that all three agree that the 1403 topics have all
been addressed. 8. Require all participants to sign an agreement that they will
not refuse medical treatment and transport to the hospital if they are injured or
possibly injured or directed by the host department and/or chief officer on the
scene. 9. PPE must be NFPA approved and 3/4 boots and rubberized coats are
not permitted. PPE must be worn in accordance with its designed use and
inspected prior to each evolution by a safety person. This includes instructors,
safety, stokers, and participants. 10. Guests participating in the training must
have a signed permission slip from their Fire Chief granting permission to
participate in the training. 11. Maintain a minimum of five hose lines; attack,
back-up for attack, stoker line, safety line and an outside 21/2” line. 12.
Designate radio frequencies and assign a designated person whose job is to do
nothing but monitor working frequencies in a quite, secluded location where
MAYDAY and emergency traffic can be immediately recognized. 13. Consider
creating safe haven rooms where crews can go for protection in critical
unplanned situations.